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Although the role of the U.S. in supporting the anti-democratic, counter-revolutionary 
movements, governments, and dictatorships that flourished in Latin America from the 
1960s to the 1990s is well known, this article examines the support provided to the U.S. 
by  other  countries.    Principally  this  support  was  provided  by  Israel  and  the  United 
Kingdom, but other countries were also involved, such as South Africa, Taiwan, France, 
and even Saudi Arabia. The article argues that a clear material framework underlies the 
assistance given by these countries. It also identifies a number of cultural and historical 
reasons why anti-democratic governments in Latin America found particular political 
empathy in Israel.  
 
 
In the truly massive loss of civilian life accompanying the various U.S.-backed counter-
insurgency  campaigns  that  took  place  in  Latin  American  countries  such  as  Chile, 
Colombia and Guatemala during the 1970s and 1980s, remarkably underreported is the 
significant participation of other countries alongside the U.S. – namely Israel and the UK, 
but also France, Taiwan, South Africa and even Saudi Arabia. It is the multiply-centered 
nature of this relationship which forms the focus of this article. I argue that it was the 
collusion of aims and arms, or what one Reagan spokesman called “a convergence of Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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interests”, which brought together Israeli, South African, British and American strategies 
in line with the desires of Latin American military and financial elites. 
  Although  ‘complexification’  describes  any  act  or  process  which  makes  a 
situation more complex, I have decided to re-employ the word more cynically in this 
article.  ‘Complexification’  here  refers  to  any  approach  that  exhibits  the  following 
characteristics in its analysis of a conflict: 
 
•  It gathers together an extensive range of different factors and variables. 
•  It levels or greatly diminishes any degree of relative importance between 
the many factors cited.  
•  It  concludes  from  the  plethora  of  factors  examined  that  no  single, 
overarching cause or culpable party can be identified. 
 
My use of the verb ‘to complexify’, therefore, refers to a de-politicising process, which 
becomes  so  metaphysically  overwhelmed  with  an  abundance  of  detail,  context  and 
individual actors that it fails – or does not wish to see – profounder, palimpsest-like 
patterns beneath the web of perspectives.2  
The  opposite  of  ‘complexification’  is  not  ‘simplification’  or  ‘monocausal 
explication’, but rather a more careful understanding of linkage within the delineation of 
complexities. Throughout the  1980s, the fact that the  Guatemalan Right referred to 
indigenous uprisings as the “Palestinianisation” of rural regions illustrates not the irony of 
the metaphor, but the very real assistance that Israel provided the Guatemalan military in 
their  repression  of  the  rebellions  (Black,  1984,  p.  154).  When  leftist  guerrillas  in  El 
Salvador kidnapped the South African ambassador in 1979, amongst their demands was 
a severance of ties with Tel Aviv and Capetown, and a recognition of the PLO (Bahbah, 
1986, p. 149).3 When British mercenaries fought alongside South African soldiers in 
Angola in the 1970s, many of the Israeli military advisors who trained them would later 
reappear in the military workshops and parade-grounds of Central America, educating 
officers and soldiers from a variety of Latin American countries in techniques of torture, 
firearm use and general counter-insurgency tactics. This plethora of different national 
actors does not constitute a hopelessly intractable web of complexities, but rather a range 
of phenomena that nonetheless observes an overall definite and substantive pattern.  
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A simplistic explanation for the above examples would be a vulgar Marxist one: First-
world capitalist nations and the pariah-states they support enthusiastically work together British and Israeli Assistance to U.S. Strategies of Torture, Almond (pp. 57-77) 
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with the wealthy elites of developing countries in order to militarise their infrastructures 
whenever the proletariat in these regions threaten to de-stabilise the plutocracies which 
international  capital  finds  so  amenable.  Such  a  formulation,  however,  inevitably 
encounters difficulties in the negotiation of at least four complicating factors.  
  Firstly,  there  are  enough  examples  of  tension  between  social  democratic 
nation-states during this period4 to show that, far from working harmoniously together, 
relations between capitalist economies, and even Cold War allies, were difficult and on 
occasion  even  hostile.  Ideological  similarity  was  no  automatic  guarantee  of  political 
collaboration. This could also be extended to Latin American countries: Galtieri and 
Pinochet's parallel persecution of the Left in their respective countries did not prevent 
them from planning military action against one another. Nor did generous finance and 
military support from the U.S. prevent the nationalism of Guatemalan generals such as 
Victores and Montt from expressing itself in moments of anti-Americanism (Black, 1984, 
p. 6). 
  Secondly,  each  of  these  players  contained  mechanisms  of  dissent  and 
factionalism. Pace Chomsky (1996), the differences between the Reagan and Carter 
administrations  in  their  attitude  towards  Central  America,  for  example,  were  still 
significant.  To  speak  of  countries  such  as  Guatemala  or  the  United  Kingdom  as 
monolithic entities is to overlook the considerable complexities within their structures. 
The internal military disputes that provoked Guatemala's sequence of coups – Lucas 
García, Montt, and Víctores – attests to a series of tensions not easily summed up by the 
blanket term ‘regime’. Likewise, it fails to register the various wranglings within the British 
Labour party over arms sales to Latin America, or the leftist Israeli representatives who 
went to meet the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua (Phythian, 2000, p. 107 ff; 
Klich, 1990, pp. 69-74). These instances problematise the demonisation of supposedly 
homogenous entities such as ‘British’ or ‘Israeli’ actors. 
  Thirdly, reductionist attempts to divide conflicts into groups of ‘oppressors’ 
and ‘oppressed’ encounter difficulties when the latter reveal themselves to be internally 
fractured  and  divided.  South  African  forces  fought  alongside  one  Angolan  group 
(UNITA) against another (MPLA); in Colombia, anti-government guerrillas were split 
into at least three main factions (FARC, ELN, M-19), whilst Guatemala's considerable 
indigenous population probably offers the most striking example of problematic notions 
of victimhood, with tensions not only evident between the Mayans and Ladinos in the 
resistance movement, but also in the role played by indigenous soldiers in the atrocities of 
the Guatemalan military (Schirmer, 1998, pp. 81-103; Garrard-Burnett, 2010, pp. 98-
107). 
  A fourth factor which might complicate simple notions of ‘capitalist states’ 
colluding with one another would be an insistence on the purely monetary dimension of Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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the weapons training or arms sales. In the case of Israel, this would mean pointing out not 
only how the Israeli state seemed willing to sell arms to almost anyone – the People’s 
Republic of China was one of its largest customers throughout the 1980s (Beit-Hallahmi, 
1987, pp. 36-7) – but more importantly how a sizeable proportion of the training and 
assistance given was on a mercenary basis, through figures such as the infamous Yair 
Klein  and  his  company  Spearhead  Ltd,  which  trained  paramilitary  death  squads  in 
Colombia in the early 1980s. The presence of mercenaries in at least some of these 
countries’  conflicts  –  Angola,  Guatemala,  Colombia  –  would  suggest  a  series  of 
individual, commercial ventures, rather than an alliance of ‘capitalist nations’ working to 
crush an insurgent, global proletariat. 
Despite the relative validity of these four complicating factors, I will argue that 
they  do  not  fundamentally  disrupt  an  overall  pattern  of  convergent  interests  in  the 
examination of British and Israeli military assistance to U.S. strategies in countries such as 
Guatemala, Colombia and Chile. The complexities these four factors bring to the analysis 
are substantial; their incorporation is a precondition for understanding how a term such 
as  ‘global  oppression’  works  at  all.  Nevertheless,  the  surprising,  and  at  times  even 
extraordinary, extent to which  weapons  and militaries from these  different countries 
could be found operating next to one another seems to reinforce a larger picture of 
capitalist  social  democracies,  working  with  local  elites,  to  prevent  the  apparatus  of 
international capital from being disrupted by whatever version of the proletariat was 
threatening to disrupt it – whether that be Palestinians, Namibians, indigenous peasants, 
or labor unions. In the following sections, we detail some of these moments.  
 
British Military As British Military As British Military As British Military Assistance to R sistance to R sistance to R sistance to Regimes in Central and Latin America egimes in Central and Latin America egimes in Central and Latin America egimes in Central and Latin America    
 
When  it  comes  to  foreign  interventions  in  Latin  America,  the  U.S.  has  had  such  a 
prominent  and  visible  role  in  the  undermining  of  ‘unsuitable’  governments  and  the 
financing of alternative regimes that a definite lack of attention can be seen with regards 
to other countries’ interests in the continent, such as those of Israel and the U.K. Most 
followers of such histories will be aware of, for example, the central role Kissinger and the 
CIA played in the overthrow of Allende's socialist government and the bombing of the 
presidential palace in Santiago, all of which served to install the U.S. backed dictator, 
Augusto Pinochet, in 1973. However, relatively few historians will be aware that, in the 
murderous bombing of Moneda Palace, British Hunter aircraft played a vital part in the 
assault (Beckett, 2003, pp. 90-1).  
Great Britain, both as a state but also less officially as a supplier of mercenaries 
and  arms,  has  played  a  considerable  role  in  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of 
military dictatorships in post-war Central and Latin America (Phythian, 2000, p. 105). As British and Israeli Assistance to U.S. Strategies of Torture, Almond (pp. 57-77) 
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we  shall  see  in  the  next  section,  we  have  reports  of  British  mercenaries  training 
paramilitaries  in  Colombia  (Castaño,  2001,  p.  12).5  Up  until  the  1982  war  with 
Argentina, both Labour and Conservative governments were enthusiastic suppliers of 
Sea Cat missiles and naval destroyers to the Argentine military regime. Indeed, the final 
sale took place ten days before the outbreak of war (Phythian, 2000, pp. 123, 125). Brazil, 
a country which saw a US-backed coup in 1964 and a dictatorship which continued in 
effect until 1985, was the largest purchaser of British arms during the 1970s, buying three 
times more than either Argentina or Chile (Phythian, 2000, p. 135). We even have an all-
too-rare  instance  of  popular  outcry  from  British  churches,  unions  and  the  media 
preventing the sale of military equipment to a right-wing dictatorship – this time El 
Salvador, which in 1977 attempted to buy a dozen armoured Saladin vehicles from the 
U.K., but found the British government unable to supply them due to intense public 
pressure (ibid, pp. 137-40). 
  The case of Britain’s relationship with Chile, however, is probably the only 
example of British interest in Latin America that a wider audience would know about, 
primarily because of the judicially unprecedented arrest of Pinochet in the U.K. in 1998. 
The arms historian Mark Phythian has been the most effective chronicler of the Anglo-
Chilean relationship during the 1970s and 1980s, charting an evolving sequence of deals, 
denials, collusion and internal tensions whose history basically teaches us three things. 
Firstly, it reveals that the assistance Britain offered Pinochet’s dictatorship was not only 
state-implemented, but also endorsed at every level all the way up to the office of the 
Prime Minister him/herself. In the year 1974 alone, by which time the newly-installed 
dictatorship had already murdered or ‘disappeared’ two thousand people (Wright, 2007, 
p. 55), 53 officers from the Chilean Navy and 223 ordinary seamen visited Britain for 
naval training courses (Phythian, 2000, p. 114). Air force bases such as RAF Bracknell 
were used to give training to Chilean pilots. In the early 1980s, so much weaponry was 
being flown to Chile that Luton Airport (in the U.K.) had a special ‘Chilean depot’. 
British aircraft were flown to Belize, and then re-painted with Chilean Air Force insignia 
to fly reconnaissance missions over Argentina (ibid., 116). Apart from these substantial 
arms sales (the U.K. had supplied effectively the bulk of the Chilean Navy) and training of 
military  personnel,  the  British  government’s  active  collaboration  with  Pinochet’s 
dictatorship  did  not  merely  agree  to  exercise  moral  self-denial,  but  also  actively  co-
operated with the very worst of the regime’s atrocities. Barely three months after the 
unmarked graves of over 600 dead had been found in Santiago cemetery, the British 
foreign minister claimed that the human rights situation was improving (ibid., 114). Even 
worse, telegrams from the British Embassy to the Foreign Office indicated that a deal had 
been done: Pinochet would allow the British SAS to set up airbases on Chilean soil, and 
in return the British government would supply more weapons, silence its human rights Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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criticism, and actively work to undermine the UN investigation into the tortures and 
disappearances proliferating under the regime.  
  A second point that emerges from this mini-history is the extent to which 
British businesses worked to lubricate the UK’s relationship with Pinochet. In 1975, 
Britain was the largest creditor to Chile after the U.S., to the tune of £14 million (ibid, p. 
110).  As  Phythian  (2000)  points  out,  the  visit  of  the  British  Trade  Minister  Cecil 
Parkinson in 1980 foreshadowed the Reagan administration’s own warming of business 
and military relations after the Carter Ban was lifted (ibid, p. 116). Two years later, when 
Pinochet’s DINA (the Chilean secret police) had murdered over a thousand people, 
another British trade delegation would declare Chile to be “a moderate and stabilising 
force” (ibid, p. 118; see also Wright, 2007, p. 80).6 A 1987 diary entry belonging to the 
British  Trade  Minister,  Alan  Clark,  succinctly  expresses  how  concerned  the  British 
government was about the torture and abuses of the Pinochet regime: 
 
Earlier today a creepy official, who is “in charge” (Heaven help us) of South 
America, came over to brief me ahead of my trip to Chile. All crap about 
human rights. Not one word about the UK interest. (Quoted in Phythian, 
2000, p. 122) 
 
The  story  of  how  Chile’s  U.S.-backed  dictatorship  ushered  in  an  era  of  neo-liberal 
economic  policies  has  been  told  numerous  times  (most  recently,  Klein,  2007).  Set 
against this background – that is, the apparent use of dictatorships to clear the way for 
free-market economic projects – the famous friendship between Pinochet and Thatcher 
was  not  merely  one  of  realpolitik,  as  Thatcher  often  claimed,  but  also  one  born  of 
ideological affinity. Although the latter point became less true as Chile’s relations with the 
U.S. in the 1980s deteriorated – and its rapport with the U.K. strengthened because of the 
Falklands conflict with Argentina – it is fair to see economic interests, mostly in the realm 
of significant arms sales, as a driving force in the manufacture of intimacy between these 
two right-wing governments.  
  However, what the ‘creepy official’ in Alan Clark's diary passage also reveals is 
the  existence  of  significant  internal  tensions  within  both  Labour  and  Conservative 
governments regarding the sale of military equipment and weapons training to brutal 
dictatorships. Emerging most clearly from the various cables between internal elements 
within the British government – the Foreign Office and the British embassy – is a degree 
of anxiety about supplying such regimes, more than any genuine ethical reservations. At 
the  outbreak  of  the  Falklands  conflict,  British  newspaper  editors  were  asked  by  the 
government  not  to  mention  the  U.K.'s  rapidly  developing  relationship  with  Chile 
(Phythian, 2000, p. 110). The attempted purchase of 300 Centaur armoured vehicles by British and Israeli Assistance to U.S. Strategies of Torture, Almond (pp. 57-77) 
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Pinochet's regime in 1984 caused unusual consternation, as it coincided at the time with 
a  new  wave  of  repression  towards  leftists,  students  and  labour  unions.  A  British 
Conservative MP visiting Chile that year insisted, in a press statement which almost 
seemed to be trying to convince himself as much as his audience, that 
  
The Chileans told me they wanted it for use in the northern desert and the 
boggy areas in the south and not for use against their own people … the 
Centaur is simply a truck; it is certainly nothing like that dreadful AMAC riot 
vehicle which the Government banned from being sold to Chile. (Quoted in 
Phythian, 2000, p. 120) 
 
Although the Centaur sale never went through, a vehicle based closely on the design was 
seen a year later on the streets of Santiago, being “used to kill students who were taking 
part in ... demonstration[s]” (Hansard, 24 July 1986, cols. 830-1 cited in Phythian, 2000, 
p. 120). The British MP’s words seem to be an example of what the philosopher Žižek 
would call “fetishist disavowal” (Žižek, 2006, p. 353): a semantic disowning of torture and 
murder, whilst simultaneously facilitating the very process of the thing disavowed. This 
cynical observation of a distance between sign and act – a desire to perform a series of 
superficial gestures, whilst secretly pursuing a very different sequence of actions – can be 
seen  in  most  of  the  British  government’s  attitudes  towards  cultivating  its  public 
relationship with the Chilean government throughout the 1980s. Phythian quotes the 
amusing memo the British Foreign Office circulated in response to the considerable 
criticism arising in the British press, as well as from Church figures such as Cardinal Basil 
Hume. Headed “Possibilities for Curtailments of Relations”, the document considered 
and dismissed various bans and boycotts the U.K. could inflict on Chile as punishment 
for its human rights abuses, concluding with its final resolution: a ban on cocktail parties 
at the Chilean Embassy. 
 
We might consider a Ministerial and senior official boycott of Chilean embassy 
social  occasions.  This  could  either  be  confined  to  FCO  contacts  or  be 
extended to the wider range of business between Whitehall and the Chilean 
embassy. (Phythian, 2000, p. 119) 
 
Of course, we are now fully in the realm of satire. If the satirical, however, implies an ironic 
sense of distance between how things should be and how they are, then many of the 
evasions  which  the  U.S.,  Guatemalan,  British  and  Israeli  governments  employed  to 
describe their behaviour had an element of the potentially satirical about them. This we 
shall see when we come to Guatemala, which re-branded the camps of forced labour it Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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ran  for  landless  peasants  it  had  dispossessed  as  “Poles  of  Development”  (Pollos  de 
desarrollo). 
  Although Britain was one of the principal arms suppliers and military allies of 
Chile, it was certainly not the only one. Quite apart from the U.S., other countries also 
helped Pinochet’s regime strengthen itself by acquiring military expertise and equipment. 
France  not  only  sold  them  sixteen  Mirage  fighter  jets,  but  also  trained  their  pilots 
(Phythian,  2000,  p.  114).  Throughout  the  1970s  Israel  sold  Chile  huge  amount  of 
weaponry: Shafirir air-to-air missiles, Reshef patrol boats, and not to mention Chile’s fleet 
of M-51 Israeli tanks, which the  British government tried to supply its V-8 Condor 
engines for (Bahbah, 1986, p. 74; Phythian, 2000, p. 119). It was Britain, however, acting 
out  of  a  mixture  of  business  and  geopolitical  interests,  coupled  after  1979  with  an 
increasing ideological compatibility, which seems to have had the least qualms in publicly 
declaring its support for a regime which, by 1990, was responsible for over 3,000 deaths 
and as many as 30,000 cases of torture. 
 
Is Is Is Israeli Military Assistance to R raeli Military Assistance to R raeli Military Assistance to R raeli Military Assistance to Regimes in Central and Latin America egimes in Central and Latin America egimes in Central and Latin America egimes in Central and Latin America    
 
‘Treat the Indians like we treat the Palestinians – don't trust any of them” – 
Israeli military advisors to Guatemalan trainees. (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1990, 
p. 141) 
 
The breadth and depth  of Israeli military assistance to regimes in South America is 
striking: Galil assault rifles and Uzi submachine guns to murder villagers in Guatemala, 
Israeli-made  napalm  to  drop  on  top  of  them  in  El  Salvador,  torture  workshops  in 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala to train interrogators in the most efficient methods, 
computer technology to help compile ‘death-lists’ of subversives, and training in Israel 
itself for the crème-de-la-crème of the military elites. This military exchange even dates 
back to the very beginning of modern Israel's history, when the Nicaraguan Somoza 
dictatorship agreed to ship arms to Jewish militias such as the Haganah in their fight 
against the British for control over historical Palestine (Aviel, 1990, p. 14).  
  Although the Nicaraguan dictator, Somoza, visited Jerusalem in 1961 (Klich, 
1990, p. 44), the first real military exchanges between Israel and central America begin in 
1964 when training courses are offered in Israel to the Guatemalan military. In the years 
between 1964 and 1971, over 160 visits to Israeli military bases are made by Guatemalan, 
Brazilian, and Bolivian military personnel, all subsidised by the U.S. (Cockburn, 1991, p. 
218). What develops over the next thirty years is an extraordinary panoply of influences – 
military, technical, political,  and even agricultural.  These influences emerge against a 
changing  background  of  U.S.  administrations,  and  spanning  a  truly  enormous British and Israeli Assistance to U.S. Strategies of Torture, Almond (pp. 57-77) 
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geographical  range  –  from  Guatemalan  regimes  and  the  training  of  the  Nicaraguan 
contras, through to the counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and Peru, to lending 
direct military assistance to regimes in Santiago and Buenos Aires.  
  The purpose of this brief section is neither to examine the reasons for Israel’s 
presence  in  Latin  American  affairs  (‘special  credit’  with  the  U.S.,  the  Carter  Ban, 
reciprocal agreements, ideological commonalities or simple economic motivation), nor 
to give an exhaustive account of it, but rather to highlight six characteristics which relate 
to some of the ‘complexities’ mentioned at the outset of the article.  
  First, the extent to which Israel’s intervention in Latin American situations 
developed in harmony with the U.S. needs to be stressed. It contrasts with the sometimes-
tense relations Britain and France experienced with the U.S. when trying to sell arms to 
Latin American countries (which U.S. administrations tend to view as their ‘backyard’). 
The CIA, for example, used former Israeli army officers such as Emil Saada to help train 
death squads in Honduras: by 1984, over 250 people in the country had been murdered. 
American-Israeli  arms  firms  such  as  Sherwood  International  helped  supply 
counterrevolutionary forces with arms (Cockburn, 1991, p. 225). U.S. National security 
advisors such as Robert McFarlane discussed with the director of Mossad how best to use 
Israel as a third party to arm and train the Contras (ibid., p. 230). Israel’s role as a ‘dirty-
work’ contractor increased in the moments Congress cut off aid to such terrorist groups, 
particularly during the Carter ban. One consequence of the generally harmonious U.S.-
Israeli interaction in Latin America was that it made Israel doubly attractive to Latin 
American regimes as a supplier of arms – purchasing weapons and training from Israel or 
Israeli  companies  bought,  for  countries  such  as  Guatemala  or  Colombia,  “special 
relationship credits” with the U.S. (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1986, pp. 16, 18; Bahbah, 1986, 
p. 98). 
  Second,  the  statistical  extent  to  which  Israel  features  in  Latin  American 
counterinsurgency  –  and  to  which  Latin  American  regimes  such  as  Colombia  and 
Guatemala have featured in Israel’s arms exports – seems to suggest an unusual amount 
of reciprocal attention between these governments, rather than merely being ‘business as 
usual’. In 1980, a third of Israel’s arms sales went to Argentina and El Salvador alone 
(Bahbah, 1986, p. 61). For Argentina, this meant 17% of its arms imports. Latin America 
in general, by 1986, accounted for half of all Israeli arms sales (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1986, 
p. 15). Victor Perera estimates over half of the 45,000 Mayan Indians killed in Guatemala 
between 1978 and 1985 died at the hands of Israeli Galil and Uzi machine guns (quoted 
in Hunter, 1987, p. 36). Israel’s significant interaction with U.S. strategies to protect 
economic interests in Central and Latin American countries, far from being the stuff of 
conspiracy theories or the artful selection of arbitrary data, is significantly reflected in 
arms sales statistics. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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  A third interesting feature is the extent to which Israeli intervention in central 
America  involved  other  countries,  including  both  the  militaries  of  other  rightwing 
countries (such as Argentina), as well as more distant countries such as the U.K., Taiwan 
and even Saudi Arabia (which gave an estimated $32 million in aid to the U.S. Contra 
program [Klich, 1990, p. 51]). We have already mentioned how, in Israel itself, extensive 
training  was  provided  in  all  kinds  of  techniques  for  Latin  American  militaries.  The 
Colombian paramilitant, Castaño, describes one such school, four hours drive outside 
Tel  Aviv,  where  in  1983  he  met  Chileans,  Argentinians,  Spaniards  and  Mexicans 
(Castaño, 2001, p. 109). In countries such as Guatemala, in particular, Israelis seem to 
have worked in close co-operation with counter-insurgents from other Latin American 
countries such as Argentina, Chile and El Salvador. The infamous Guatemalan army 
intelligence agency G-2 (called ‘La Dos’) was equipped and trained not only by Israelis, 
but also in conjunction with Argentina, Colombian, Chilean and Taiwanese expertise 
(Schirmer, 1998, p. 152). The Israeli embassy in Guatemalan City was used as a regular 
point of contact between Israelis, the U.S. and counterrevolutionary Nicaraguan Contras 
(Jamail and Gutierrez, 1990, p. 130). Torture workshops, it appears, were a frequent 
point of international collaboration (Landau,  1993, pp.  182-183).  The scholar Israel 
Shahak describes, in a 1981 report, how: 
 
An especially important item of Israeli export are the so-called ‘anti-terror’ 
Israeli specialists. Those are really experts in torture, especially in the more 
sophisticated methods of torture, such as inflict maximum amount of pain 
without killing. The Israeli ‘specialists’ who return home, blame very much the 
‘local torturers’ for ‘being emotional’ and so ‘killing too early’, and in their 
opinion,  ‘unnecessarily’.  Guatemala  has  become  the  centre  for  training  of 
torturers by Israeli ‘experts’ in this trade, and for other states as well. The case of 
El Salvador where the Orden people are trained by Israelis in Guatemala has 
been known for some time. (Shahak, cited in Rubenberg, 1990, pp. 114-5) 
 
Israelis were helping Argentines to train Cuban and Nicaraguan Contras at U.S. Army 
bases  in  Honduras  and  counter-revolutionary  El  Salvadorans  in  Guatemala,  while 
Argentinian planes transporting Israeli arms to Guatemala (see Aviel, 1990, p. 33; and 
Bahbah, 1986, p. 186).7 What emerges here is not a single-country initiative, or simple 
case of Israel offering to do a one-time favour to strengthen the U.S. relationship, but 
rather a consistent network of anti-revolutionary alliances, overcoming local divides to 
fight against a groundswell of indigenous mobilisation, organized labour and armed leftist 
resistance. 
The close relationship between the Israeli state and the ‘independent’ arms British and Israeli Assistance to U.S. Strategies of Torture, Almond (pp. 57-77) 
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dealers and mercenaries it tried, in response to human rights concerns, to distance itself 
from, is another interesting factor in these activities. The intimacy that existed between 
the  Israeli  government,  arms  firms  and  the  ex-military  personnel  that  supplied  and 
trained death squads and drug cartels, further complicates the notion of state sovereignty 
as being based on the exclusion of non-state actors. It shows how political decisions in Tel 
Aviv and Jerusalem were taken in collusion with allegedly independent actors. Of course, 
state figures such as Peres and Sharon openly visited and contributed to regimes such as 
those in Nicaragua and Honduras (Shimon Peres in 1957, Ariel Sharon in 1984 [Aviel, 
1990, pp. 31, 15]). However in many other ways, the Israeli state supported the whole 
spectrum of legal and illegal activities in Latin America, from the use of El Al planes to 
deliver shipments of arms to the regime in Managua (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1990, p. 128), 
to the Israeli industry minister who told Argentina there might be “difficulties” in meat 
imports from Buenos  Aires if the Argentinian government didn’t go ahead with the 
purchase of six Arava transporters (Bahbah, 1986, p. 95). 
  Israeli arms firms enjoyed a special relationship with their government. Even 
today, Israel has one of the most nationalised arms industries in the world, with three of 
its four largest defence companies (IMI, Rafael, IAI) completely owned by the state 
(Lifshitz, 2010, p. 271). Arms firms from the 1970s and 1980s such as GeoMilTech and 
Sherwood International enjoyed a privileged status. They had well-located offices in Tel 
Aviv and Washington, and special access to captured Soviet weaponry in the Israeli-
Lebanon conflict (Cockburn, 1991, pp. 227, 234). However, the most striking aspect of 
this  intimacy  is  the  extent  to  which  some  of  the  most  notorious  gunrunners  and 
mercenaries involved – such as Mike Harari, Pesakh Ben Or, and Yair Klein – were 
directly connected with the highest echelons of the Israeli establishment. The trainer of 
paramilitaries in Colombia and South Africa, Yair Klein, operated under an official Israeli 
government  license;  Colonel  Leo  Gleser,  a  former  Israeli  commando,  sold  arms  to 
Honduras through an Israeli firm (ISDS) publicised by the Israeli Ministry of Defence 
(ibid., p. 225); and former Mossad operator Mike Harari, who sold guns to the Panama 
regime in the 1980s, was the brother-in-law of Israel’s attorney general, Dorith Beinish 
(ibid., p. 259). Israeli mercenaries, in other words, were not rogue outlaws, but rather 
semi-autonomous agents who could not have operated as efficiently as they did without 
the backing and the endorsement of the Israeli state. 
  A fifth point concerns the way Israeli influence in Central America was not 
merely limited to weapons supply, training activities, military expertise, or assisting the 
establishment  of  computer  systems  designed  to  detect  and  organise  information  on 
subversives. It was also manifested more subtly in the post-massacre re-organisation of 
the landscape and permanent fragmentation of communities. In Guatemala, hundreds of 
thousands of refugees, mostly indigenous, had fled their homes during the worst periods Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
 
 
  68
of  massacres.  The  ‘poles  of  development’  were  forced  re-settlements  of  displaced 
indigenous in highly controlled and tightly regulated units. Their inspiration was taken 
from, to a significant degree, the principles of Jewish kibbutzes and moshav agricultural 
collectivities in an attempt to regain control, both physical as well as ideological, of the 
rural population (one observer called them “a distorted replica of rural Israel” [Perera, 
quoted in Hunter, 1987, p. 42]). One of the architects of the scheme, a Guatemalan Air 
Force Colonel called Eduardo Wohlers, was trained in Israel.  
  These schemes – new village plans where forcibly resettled refugees bought all 
their food from military stores and were constantly supervised by resident soldiers and 
the police – created local patrols of villagers who were encouraged to take up arms and 
police their own communities. Jennifer Schirmer, in her classic study of the Guatemalan 
military project, shows in some detail how “nowhere else in Latin America has an army 
managed to mobilize and divide an indigenous population against itself” (1998, p. 81). 
Ideas  of  private  ownership  were  systematically  developed  in  the  peasants  of  these 
resettlement camps as ‘insurance’ against future subversion. Conscription in these village 
militias was sometimes violent: when Mayan Indians refused to join such civilian patrols, 
entire villages were massacred to “teach them a lesson” (ibid., p. 83). In a policy which, 
according to one counterinsurgency expert, was 60% Guatemalan, 20% inspired by U.S. 
experience  in  Vietnam  and  20%  by  Israeli  and  Taiwanese  operations,  a  confusing 
impression of civil war – of peasants fighting revolutionaries – was deliberately cultivated 
by the military in order to confuse human rights organisations and foreign observers 
(ibid., p. 59). Indeed, by extending the use of civil patrols throughout the male peasant 
population,  forced  indigenous  complicity  in  violent  killings  resulted  in  a  convenient 
dispersion  of  responsibility.  In  other  words,  the  involvement  of  locals  in  individual 
killings  was  so  successful  that  even  indigenous  communities  felt  threatened  by  the 
presence of human rights investigators.  
  One final point to emerge from any study of Israel's involvement in Central 
and Latin America is the degree of internal dissent within Israel regarding, in this case, 
Shimon  Pere’s  support  for  Nicaragua’s  autocratic  dictatorship  and,  once  it  was 
overthrown, the U.S. backed contras who were trying to restore it.  Israeli leftists and trade 
unionists – mostly from the Mapam party – displayed a show of solidarity with the left-
wing Sandinistas, attempting to pass a 1982 bill that would have vetoed Israel’s arm sales 
to El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. As Ignacio Klich (1990, p. 68) points out, 
party-to-party ties between Israel’s Mapam and the Nicaraguan FSLN developed, with 
the  Knesset  leader  Haika  Grossman  even  visiting  Nicaragua  at  the  invitation  of  the 
Sandinistas in 1984. Internal dissent also came about, for somewhat different reasons, 
when it was revealed how, between 1976 and 1979, over a thousand Argentinian Jews 
(mostly leftists) had been abducted and tortured by the very same Argentinian military British and Israeli Assistance to U.S. Strategies of Torture, Almond (pp. 57-77) 
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the Israeli government was arming and training.8 Although this degree of dissent was 
never significant enough to change policy, it certainly deserves mention.  
    
Cultural and P Cultural and P Cultural and P Cultural and Politi oliti oliti olitical factors: P cal factors: P cal factors: P cal factors: Positive Latin American I ositive Latin American I ositive Latin American I ositive Latin American Images of Israel  mages of Israel  mages of Israel  mages of Israel     
    
Even a small range of texts – the memoirs of a Guatemalan diplomat, interviews with a 
Colombian paramilitant, articles from a Guatemalan military journal – show how non-
material  factors  facilitated  what  otherwise  might  have  seemed  an  unlikely  alliance: 
namely, the collusion of the Jewish state with right-wing and neo-fascist Latin American 
regimes.9  The  categories  of  Latin  American  admiration  for  Israel  are  fourfold:  anti-
colonial, biblical, Enlightenment, and what may be termed ‘Nietzschean’. 
  Anti-colonial  sympathy  for  Israel  from  countries  such  as  Guatemala  and 
Nicaragua emerged in the very early days of the Israeli state (although it is resurrected in 
Somoza’s 1980 memoirs [see Somoza and Cox, 1980, p. 156]). It stems from Latin 
Americans’ sense of solidarity with a young, fledgling nation, newly-emergent from an 
independence struggle against the British – a situation some observers saw as historically 
analogous to the nineteenth-century independence struggles of Latin American nations 
against their Spanish overlords. One of the members of the 1947 UN Special Committee 
on Palestine was a Guatemalan liberal, Jorge Garcia Granados, and immediately after the 
experience of visiting the British Mandate of Palestine he wrote a book about it, The Birth 
of Israel (1948). Anti-colonial sympathy for the Jewish settlers in Palestine is a sentiment 
that pervades the book from beginning to end. In Granados’ various disputes with the 
European delegates over the activity of Jewish resistance groups, the Guatemalan tells his 
colleagues: “For us Latin Americans … you English have forgotten what it is to be stirred 
by revolutionary feelings” (ibid, p. 54). At the very start of the book, Granados states even 
more explicitly: 
 
I was to find many parallels, both political and sociological, between Palestine 
and Guatemala … Palestine  had emerged  from the yoke of the  Ottoman 
Empire to find itself the victim of tremendous political and social pressures. 
Guatemala had been forged on a like anvil. For centuries Guatemala, from the 
time of the conquistadors in 1524, had suffered under Spanish absolutism.  
 Some of Palestine's problems appeared not dissimilar to those of Guatemala. 
Both  are  essentially  agricultural  countries  with  large  masses  of  backward, 
ignorant peasantry. In Guatemala this peasantry, exploited by a small, rich, 
landed upperclass, represents fully two-thirds of the population. Vast areas of 
the  country  lie  waste,  and  there  is  a  desperate  need  for  utilizing  modern Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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technology to raise the standard of living. (Granados, 1948, p. 17). 
 
There are some curious manoeuvres here. In his empathy for the anti-colonial struggle of 
the  Haganah  and  admiration  for  the  Hatikvah  (Jewish  national  anthem),  Granados 
airbrushes out the Palestinians from the picture. (In the same way, it is tempting to 
suggest, certain Latin American histories airbrushed the indigenous out from their own 
independence struggles). Granados is not cruelly indifferent to the Palestinians – in the 
book,  he  does  acknowledge  Palestinian  losses  of  land  and  the  difficulties  they  are 
encountering  –  but  this  never  quite  displaces  the  Jewish/Bolivarian  struggle  against 
British-Ottoman/Spanish rule that underlies the ultimate framing of the book.  
  A second factor in Latin American sympathies towards Israel lies in a biblical 
series of connotations which, however strange it may sound, do appear to have operated 
as a facilitating factor in certain Catholic right-wing nationalisms (not to mention the 
evangelical  Protestantism  of  Rios  Montt).  It  clearly  features  in  Granados’  visit  to 
Palestine. As soon as he arrived, he writes, “I was all eyes for Biblical landscapes” (ibid., p. 
31). Repeated references to “the Jews [who] had never forgotten their ancient homeland” 
(ibid., p. 63), “the land which is sacred to millions of human beings” (ibid., p. 30), show 
how the Guatemalan diplomat’s Christian background played a role in his privileging of 
the needs of Jewish settlers over Palestinian inhabitants. This bias also manifests itself in 
the most unlikely of places. Take, for instance, the words of Carlos Castaño, a Colombian 
paramilitary leader and narcotrafficker responsible for countless atrocities, including the 
murder of journalist Jaime Garzon. He speaks of his yearlong stay in Israel for military 
training at the age of eighteen as a life-changing experience. The religious aspect of this 
visit was by no means incidental:  
 
The history of Israel is delightful and illuminating. You should start by taking 
a shekel in the hand, just like receiving Christ … I admire the Jews for their 
courage in the face of anti-Semitism, for their strategy in the Diaspora, for the 
resolve  of  their  Zionism,  their  mysticism,  religion  and,  above  all,  their 
nationalism. 
While living in Israel, I won a few friends, including an old man whom I loved 
to go and listen to whilst he sang or recited poetry in Hebrew, his native 
tongue, the language of the Bible itself. It was so moving. (Castaño, 2001, pp. 
108, 110 – translation is my own) 
 
Castaño’s violent life as leader of the AUC finds an uncanny co-existence alongside his 
homage to the profound spirituality of the Holy Land, with the surreal image of the future British and Israeli Assistance to U.S. Strategies of Torture, Almond (pp. 57-77) 
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paramilitary, listening to Hebrew recitations of the Psalms. There is no time here to dwell 
on the relationship between mysticism and violence, although it is difficult not to see an 
element of Charles Maurras in the mystical inspiration of so violent a paramilitary.10 
What is clear, however, is the extent to which Castaño’s Christian background assisted his 
Israeli  military  training.  Given  the  Guatemalan  General  Rios  Montt’s  own  fervent 
religiosity  and  interaction  with  American  evangelicals  during  the  worst  years  of  the 
massacres, it is difficult not to see this Christian recognition of the biblical identity of 
Israel as playing some part, however small, in the extensive collaboration between Israel 
and Guatemala during this period.  
  Apart from biblical and anti-colonial sympathies, a third factor would be an 
admiration of Israel as a civilising, colonising, first-world power: an outpost of progress 
forever threatened by a deluge of indigenous fanaticism and backwardness. Analogous to 
Israel’s own relationship with South Africa (Sharon seeing the ANC as an African version 
of the PLO, for example [see Polakow-Suransky, 2010, p. 8]), a definite Enlightenment 
sympathy for a fellow outpost of modernity can be detected in some of the ways the 
Guatemalan military wrote about Israel. “Israel is a small country who is doing a massive 
job”, said one Guatemalan general to the newspaper Ma'ariv in 1981. “We see the Israeli 
as the best soldier in the world today, and we look to him as a model and an example for 
us” (quoted in Shahak, 1982, p. 48). In the 1977 issue of the military journal, Revista 
Militar, we find an outline of events in the Israeli-Palestine conflicts of 1948-1977. The 
picture presented is one of a developed nation, surrounded by envious Arab foes. The 
timeline begins not with the displacement of thousands of Palestinians by Jewish militias 
in 1947, but with the “Arab countries invading Palestine” in 1948 (Asturias, 1977, pp. 51-
58). The Palestinians are repeatedly referred to as “terroristas” (p. 51), and emerge along 
with  their  Arab  neighbours  as  consistently  aggressive  and  “subversive”,  with  Israel's 
actions largely being seen as retaliatory. In another 1984 issue of the same journal, the 
position of Israel as an island of modernity in a sea of barbarism is underlined by the 
reproduction of a series of conservative Argentinian newspaper articles on the Middle 
East,  with  severe  portraits  of  Saddam  Hussein,  Muammar  Gaddafi  and  Ayatollah 
Khomeini (“un fanatico medieval” [Ronen, 1984, p. 109]), alongside several photographs 
of explosions and mushroom clouds, generally presenting a Middle Eastern landscape of 
feudalism, violence and volatility. 
  The  final  factor  in  sympathetic  Latin  American  responses  to  Israel  I  have 
decided to term ‘Nietzschean’, as it involves – as Nietzsche endorsed in Genealogy of 
Morals – an admiration for those who are not ashamed of exercising their power and, 
indeed, who embrace and affirm their aggression. This admiration is best expressed in 
Castaño: 
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There  I  became  convinced  that  it  was  possible  to  defeat  the  guerrillas  in 
Colombia. I began to see how a people could defend themselves against the 
whole world … In fact, the concept of armed self-defense I copied from the 
Israelis, every citizen of this nation is a potential soldier. 
In Israel managed to open my mind … I learned from other wars and already 
possessed  a  panoramic  vision  of  the  country.  I  tried  to  absorb  as  much 
knowledge  as  possible  of  the  Jews,  a  wonderful  people  of  God,  who  have 
always lived in  war and for thousands of years  have been in the  mode  of 
defending themselves, invading and winning territory. The trip to the Holy 
Land was a momentous occasion in my life. (Castaño, pp. 108, 111 – my own 
translation) 
 
Israel’s performance in the Lebanon War impressed many Latin American observers in 
the military, and was a central factor in the successful arms sales of the period. The four 
factors we have cited here do not necessarily sit easily next to one another. Indeed, a 
liberal such as Granados has little in common with a murderer like Castaño. The extent 
to which such factors caused, facilitated, or merely resulted from the concrete assistance 
Israel gave to such regimes and paramilitaries in the 1970s and 1980s remains disputable 
and probably incalculable. What the above array of quotations does show, however, is 
that  Israeli  assistance  to  the  (para)militaries  of  Guatemala  and  Colombia  was  no 
straightforward  series  of  ideologically-neutral  transactions,  but  rather  an  ongoing 
intervention coloured by a variety of different affinities – religious, political and colonial. 
  In their classic work, Empire, Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 46) consider some of 
the “real alternatives and the potential for liberation that exist within Empire”. They 
suggest that globalisation, far from being the source of all our woes, may contain within it 
positive  emancipatory  possibilities,  ones  which  express  “the  power  of  the  global 
multitude” (ibid., p. 47). Any study of British and Israeli involvement in Latin America 
during this time period suggests, at least, the need for some reservations. In the pre-digital 
world of the 1970s and 1980s, what is striking is the speed with which reactionary forces 
could  bring  all  manner  of  assistance  –  economic,  military,  political,  ideological,  and 
cultural – to their counterparts, employing an appalling dexterity of common interest 
and, in the moments of most sublime co-operation, a terrifying sense of harmony. Here is 
not the place to contest Hardt and Negri’s conviction that the globality of capital may 
well prove to be its undoing – indeed, current events across the world at the time of 
writing may well be reinforcing their thesis – but it is instructive to bear in mind that the 
assistance which sympathetic Middle Eastern and North African leaders like Muammar 
Gaddafi and the PLO offered leftist movements such as the Sandinistas began in earnest British and Israeli Assistance to U.S. Strategies of Torture, Almond (pp. 57-77) 
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over fifteen years after Israel had delivered its first arms shipment to Nicaragua. 
  The international support of military dictatorships, brutal governments, and 
paramilitary networks in Latin  America during the decades of the 1970s and  1980s 
belonged to a pattern. It was not a pattern of perfect symmetry, not a mathematical model 
that could be used to predict future developments, and certainly not a paradigm free of 
any deviations,  variations  and spontaneous idiosyncrasies. It was a pattern, however, 
which produced phenomena – the displacement of peasants, the murder of indigenous 
peoples, the torture and disappearance of activists and labour organisers – which could 
be found as far afield as the hills of Oaxaca, the forests of Ixil, the streets of Bogotá, the 
police  stations  of  Santiago  and  the  underground  garages  of  Buenos  Aires.  In  the 
boardrooms of New York, London and Chicago, a certain familiar logic of preference for 
capital  over  people  was  cultivated,  whose  effects  would  echo  themselves  in  endless 
command centres and training schools, and re-echo themselves in the elite clubrooms 
and closed offices of practically every Latin American country. The sad complexity of this 
plutocracy-preserving process, which would draw dollars, weapons and aid from Saudi 
sheikhs,  Israeli  ministers,  Taiwanese  officers,  British  businesses  and  South  African 
generals, is not baffling but depressing; not enigmatic or impenetrable, but dark and 
profound. 
A Latin American Nuremberg is called for. During the period in question, 
hundreds of thousands of human beings were not merely executed but literally strangled, 
gutted, skinned, electrocuted, disembowelled or physically beaten to death. Over thirty 
years have passed since the worst of the atrocities considered in this brief study. Obvious 
candidates for war crimes tribunals – such as the former U.S. secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger,  the  former  British  Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher,  or  the  former 
Guatemalan president Efrain Rios Montt – are by now too old for any effective trial to 
take place. And although in Argentina and Chile some progress is now being made in 
identifying and prosecuting war criminals, a vast array of British, U.S. and Israeli senior 
officers  and  politicians  –  who  were  wholly  supportive  of  the  very  worst  massacres, 
abductions  and  torture  programmes  and  participated,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  their 
implementation – remain untouched by any form of judicial retribution. These include 
defence officials from all three governments; military officials who gave, allowed and 
organised training to perpetrators of the massacres; diplomatic staff, even up to the office 
of the Ambassador him/herself, who knowingly facilitated military instruction or aid to 
the perpetrators; government offices and their secretaries and staff who endorsed sales of 
arms to obvious human rights abusers; British, U.S. and Israeli lobbyists who helped to 
circumvent  already  extant  structures  of  control  and  regulation  –  either  to  enable 
equipment and aid to be delivered, or to actively stifle news of atrocities from being 
widely  disseminated.  The  relative  paucity  of  international  judicial  attention  to  such Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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glaring crimes not only acts as a moral indictment of the West, but also encourages 
suspected  war  criminals  such  as  Otto  Perez  Molina  (the  newly-elected  president  of 
Guatemala) to continue their political careers unperturbed.  
 
Notes Notes Notes Notes
 
1  This paper was first given as a talk at the Amnesty International Chapters of Berry 
College (Rome, Georgia) and Georgia State University (Atlanta, Georgia) in 2012. 
Many thanks to Henry “Chip” Carey, Roberto Gutierrez and John Hickman.  
2  Take for example David Stoll (1993, p. 313), who sees the people of Nebaj as resisting 
“not just the Guatemalan army … capitalism and colonialism but violence itself … the 
mimetic contest in which Right and Left, counterinsurgent and insurgent, try to remake 
an entire society in their own starkly polarized images”. Even the otherwise excellent 
study of Virginia Garrard-Burnett (2010, p. 178) feels obliged to end the work with the 
words of former director of Amnesty International USA,  William Schulz: “Human 
rights  violators  are  not  born,  but  made  …  It's  a  combination  of  social  context, 
leadership, and political opportunity that often leads people astray”. 
3  See also Indiana Gazette, 10 October 1980. 
4  For example, consider American disapproval over British arms sales to Chile (Phythian, 
2000, pp. 128-9), or the deteriorating relations between the British Wilson government 
and South Africa. 
5  I am grateful to Staffan Lofving's article (2004) for drawing my attention to this text. 
6  For more on DINA, see Lawson (2004, p. 183ff.)  
7  The involvement of U.S. training in these death squads has been detailed by Gill (2004, 
pp. 83-4). 
8  For an interesting history of  anti-Semitism in the  Argentine Right, particularly the 
widespread association of Jews with the Argentine Left, see McGee Deutsch (1986, pp. 
113-34). 
9  As Chomsky (1996, p. 203) points out, some of these regimes openly admired Nazism 
in their pronouncements and publications. 
10 On the relationship between mysticism and violence, see Žižek (2003, pp. 23-4). For 
an  unusually  lucid  update  on  paramilitary  and  narco-trafficker  violence  in  today's 
Colombia, see Wilkinson (2011, pp. 38-42). On the incorporation of paramilitarism 
into the U.S.'s overall strategy in Colombia, see Stokes (2005). 
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